MOUNTLAUREL AT 21 YEARS: REFLECTIONS
ON THE POWER OF COURTS AND
LEGISLATURES TO SHAPE SOCIAL CHANGE
John CharlesBoger*

I.

MOUNTLwUREL-A

DISTINGUISHED PEER OFBROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION

The mid-century commitment by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Brown v. Board of Education,' first to desegregate America's
racially segregated public schools and then, more broadly, to end all
state-sanctioned racial segregation,' constitutes one of the most remarkable and ambitious re-definitions of the judicial role in the history of Anglo-American law.3 Legal historians are hard-pressed to identify any
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. A.B., Duke University, 1968; M.Div., Yale University, 1971; J.D., University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill, 1974. My gratitude to UNC law students Charlie Henn, Tom Johnson, and
Anna Schleunes for their excellent research assistance.
' 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 See generally Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.,
365 U.S. 715 (1961)
(restaurants in city-owned facility); Gayle v. Browder, 352 US. 903 (1956) (public
buses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches and public bathhouses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 35 U.S. 879 (1955) (city golf courses).
3 See, e.g., MORTON J.HORwITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 18701960, 258-60 (1992) (designating the Supreme Court's opinion in Brown as the preeminent indicator of a new judicial activism); WILLIAM LASSER, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL
POWER 163 (1988) (asserting that Brown changed the role of the Court "forever" in
American politics and society); G. EDWARD WHITE, Earl Warren's Influence on the Warren Court, in THE WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POuTICAL PERSPECTIVE 37, 49-50
(1993) (observing that Brown inaugurated a new era of Supreme Court jurisprudence in
which moral justifications were assigned greater weight); Abram Chayes, The Role of the
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1298-302 (1976) (discussing
how the desegregation doctrine has expanded and broadened the judicial power through
the fashioning of equitable decrees); Michael J. Klarman, Brown v. Board of Education,
Facts and Political Correctness, 80 VA. L. REV. 85, 196-97 (1994) (comparing Brown
with earlier civil rights cases, and stressing the extent to which it intervened in the social
and political environment of the country); see also WILLIAM EATON, WHO KILLED THE
CONSTITUTION? 50 (1988) ("Fashioned in [Brown], there began to settle upon the Court a
mantle of arrogance, suspiciously purple in hue, cut in the kind of 'justice' which Holmes
hated, and which soon came to obscure the plain black robes of justice under law.").
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close parallels in English jurisprudence." Professor Morton J. Horwitz
has taught us to appreciate how boldly our nation's courts acted in the
nineteenth century, reshaping the law of torts, contracts, and federal jurisdiction in the interest of the nation's emerging capitalism.' Yet Chief
Justice John Marshall, Joseph Story, and their allies could scarcely have
imagined how thoroughly the Warren Court would interject itself and the
federal judiciary into the workings of the nation's public institutions,6 not
only its schools," but eventually its police stations,' its prisons,' and its
social welfare agencies as well.'" The most striking feature of this wideranging judicial activism has been its self-conscious determination to
4 See generally Raoul Berger, ConstitutionalInterpretationand Activist Fantasies,82
Ky. L.J. 1, 24-25 (1993-94) (indicating that the Court's decision in Brown broke from
centuries of common-law jurisprudence by refusing to search for the original interpretation of the Post-Civil War Amendments).

5

See generally MORTON J. HORWrrZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW

1780-1860 (1977).
6 See, e.g., BERNARD SCHwARTz, INSIDE THE WARREN CoURT 4 (1983) ("In expanding civil liberties, broadening political freedom, extending the franchise, reinforcing freedoms of speech, assembly, and religion, limiting the power of the politicians in smokefilled rooms, defining the limits of police power, the Warren Court had no equal in
American history.").
7 See generally Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971);
Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S. 218
(1964); Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1
(1958); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
8 See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (granting criminal defendants the right to assistance of counsel during police line-ups); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 449 (1966) (requiring state police officers to inform a criminal suspect of his Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights prior to any custodial interrogation); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) (requiring the suppression at state criminal trials of evidence seized by
the police in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments); Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) (requiring the suppression of statements made by a criminal
suspect to police if obtained after an undue delay between the time of arrest and the time
of presentment before a magistrate). See generally A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court
and CriminalProcedure, in THE WARREN COURT:

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (Richard Sayler

et al., eds. 1969).
9 See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (creating minimum federal constitutional standards for medical care to state prisoners); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539 (1974) (establishing minimum federal due process standards for prison disciplinary
proceedings); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969)(forbidding prison administrators
from denying inmates the right to provide legal assistance to other inmates); Lee v.
Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (mandating the racial desegregation of prison cells).
10 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (requiring state welfare departments to provide evidentiary hearings, upon request, prior to termination of AFDC benefits); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (forbidding states from imposing oneyear waiting limits before new state residents could apply for AFDC benefits); King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (preventing states from enforcing a "cohabitation" or
'substitute father" rule that would to deny AFDC aid to children whose mothers lived
with another man).

1452

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[27:1450

move beyond the adjudication of private claims and, at the behest of
willing plaintiffs, to examine how basic public institutions organize and
conduct themselves, and then to re-form those institutions in the name of
greater dignity and equality for all citizens."H Law reform by the judici-

ary, in the Brown tradition, remains an extraordinary, still controversial,
judicial endeavor.
Looking backward now, at the close of this century, New Jersey's
Mount Laurel cases12 join Brown as among the most ambitious judicial
crusades of this distinctive era. Mount Laurel shares with Brown a central concern over race and segregation, yet in crucial institutional respects
outlined below, the New Jersey Supreme Court seems even bolder than
its federal predecessor. While the Warren Court aimed its equitable
powers primarily at public institutions like school boards, which were

readily made parties to lawsuits and were amenable, in principle if not in
fact, to judicial degrees, the justices who joined in crafting Mount Laurel,

especially Mount Laurel II, sought to influence the behavior, not merely
of public officials but of thousands of private market actors not before the
court-housing developers, home seekers, renters, everyone who participated in New Jersey's housing market.

One current scholarly debate questions the efficacy of such judicial
activism, asking whether courts truly possess the capacity to make the
significant real-world difference that their decrees purport to set in mo-

tion."

Professor Gerald Rosenberg has recently made a provocative

contribution to that debate in his thoughtful book, THE HOLLOW HOPE,
n See Kermit L. Hall, The Warren Court. Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 28 IND.
L. REV. 309, 317 (1995) ("the Warren Court was notable because it concluded that discrimination was not a random, individualized act but a governmentally supported set of
social preferences structured along cultural lines.... [hey realized that... they held
the power to redefine political and social relationships in favor of those who had previously been disadvantaged.").
12 See South Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713 (1975) (Mount Laurel /); South Burlington NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (Mount Laurel 11). Some commentators have
described Hills Development Co. v. Township of Bernards, 103 N.J.1, 510 A.2d 621
(1986), upholding the New Jersey Fair Housing Act of 1985 as "Mount Laurel I." I
refer to these cases collectively as Mount Laurel.
13 See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HoLLow HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); Derrick Bell, Brown and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, in
SHADES OF BROWN: NEw PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 91 (Derrick Bell ed.,
1980); Alexander T. Aleinikoff, The Limits of Litigation: Putting the Education Back into
Brown v. Board of Education, 80 MICH. L. REv. 896 (1982); Stephen L. Carter, Do
Courts Matter? 90 MICH. L. REV. 1216 (1992); Malcolm M. Feeley, Hollow Hope, Flypaper, and Metaphors, 17 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 745 (1992); Samuel Krislov, The Hollow
Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 367 (1992);
L.A. Powe, Jr., The Supreme Court, Social Change, and Legal Scholarship, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1615 (1992).
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which contends that most judicial decisions, even Brown itself, actually
have little practical impact."4 The marvelous empirical study of Mount
Laurel by Dr. Naomi Wish and Stephen Eisdorfer"5 that has appropriately
occasioned this Symposium provides timely new information relevant to
this larger discussion, because it not only (1) assesses in detail the ultimate impact of the Mount Laurel decisions in meeting the housing needs
of New Jersey's low- and moderate-income urban dwellers, but also (2)
offers illuminating evidence concerning the broader question of judicial
effectiveness posed by Professor Rosenberg and his colleagues. After
carefully examining the Wish-Eisdorfer Report for data on New Jersey's
concrete achievements in addressing the problems identified by Mount
Laurel in 1975, I reflect briefly on the larger implications of the WishEisdorfer Report for Rosenberg's thesis.
II. THE SPECIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF MOUNTLAUREL
Any assessment of Mount Laurel's twenty-first birthday should begin with a celebration of its significant contribution to our understanding
of the interaction of racial discrimination, poverty, and geography, as
well as the crucial role played by government in shaping and controlling
the destinies of the urban poor. 6 Mount Laurel, more clearly than any
prior judicial decision, exposed the power of local laws to shape not only
the economic and social characteristics of particular communities but the
overall demography of state and regional populations and, thereby, the
resulting distribution of state public services. I know of no federal or
state judicial decision, unless it be Abbott v. Burke"7 (also the visionary
work of the New Jersey Supreme Court), that reflects a more thorough
understanding of these interrelationships.
Among Mt. Laurel's rich intellectual lessons-still not fully appropriated-has been its insistent faith in the possibility of governmentallyinduced change, one that eventually prompted the New Jersey legislature
and the Council on Affordable Housing (COAH) 8 to fashion Mount Laurel's idealism into an administrative mandate for action. In the current
14

See ROSENBERG, supra note 13, at 42-156.

15

See generally NAOMI BAILIN WISH & STEPHEN EISDORFER, THE IMPACT OF THE MT.

LAUREL INrmATivEs:

AN ANALYSIS

OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF APPuCANTS

AND

OCCUPANTS (1996) [hereinafter WISH & EISDORFER].
16 Subsequent scholarship has expanded upon these insights in ways that vindicate the

basic observations of the Mount Laurel court. See, e.g.,

DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY
A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS

(1993); Roberta Actenberg, Symposium, Shaping American Communities: Segregation,
Housing & the Urban Poor, 143 U. PA. L. RE'. 1191 (1995).
17 119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d 359 (1990).
's N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-305 (West 1986).
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era of widespread skepticism about the power of government, the New
Jersey Fair Housing Act of 19859 demonstrates the feasibility of creating
a statewide administrative agency, charged with: (1) assessing the racial,
ethnic, and income demography of the state's metropolitan regions; (2)
identifying and quantifying the low- and moderate-income housing needs
in each such region; and (3) allocating to each community within each
region its own "fair share" of the overall regional housing need.' These
are great, notable achievements. However strongly we may lament the
particular choices made by the New Jersey legislature and COAH, and I
will fault some of them shortly, their positive achievements constitute an
important beginning.

Ill. THE MIXED SUCCESS OF MOUNTLAUREL AND ITS LEGISLATIVE
OFFSPRING

The actual success of Mount Laurel in addressing the housing needs
of New Jersey's citizens requires closer analysis. Naomi Wish and Stephen Eisdorfer caution that all who assess Mount Laurel should remember that these decisions embraced not one goal, but three:
(1) to increase the supply of low- and moderate-income housing in
New Jersey;
(2) to further the mobility of some fraction of the low- and moderateincome residents out of New Jersey's central cities; and

(3) simultaneously, to encourage racial and ethnic desegregation
throughout the state by altering the racial demography of New Jersey's cities and suburban municipalities.21
Mount Laurel has met considerable success in addressing its first
goal of housing production. Professor John Payne has recently evaluated
this Mount Laurel objective in exemplary fashion.' His summary indicates that well over 13,000 new units have been constructed or rehabilitated since Mount Laurel // was announced; affordable housing that
would not otherwise have been built. 3 Is that "enough?" Certainly not
if one considers New Jersey's overall housing need, estimated at more
than 675,000 units. Certainly not if one realizes that virtually all of these
units, whether sale or rental, were priced well beyond the means of vast
"9 See id. §§ 52:27D-301 to -329.
20 See id. § 52:27D-307(a-e).

21 See WISH & EISDORFER, supra note 15, at 10.

22 See John M. Payne, Norman Wolliams, Exclusionary Zoning, and the Mount Laurel
Doctrine: Making the Theory Fit the Facts, 20 VT. L. REv. 665 (1996).
23 See id. at 673-74; see also WISH & EISDORFER, supra note 15, at 19 & nn. 51-52
(discussing various estimates of the impact of Mourn Laurel on new housing construction

and rehabilitation).
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numbers of New Jersey's poor. Yet, Professor Payne employs a more
appropriate measure:
Since the advent of the federal housing subsidy program in 1937,
public sector funding [throughout the United States, at federal, state,
and local levels] has produced an average of 2,400 units per year,
while Mount Laurel production ranges from 1,350 to 2,700 units per
year, depending on whether one measures from Mount Laurel II in
1983 or from the first COAH decisions in 1987. This type of comparison... is a more realistic frame within which to judge the Mount
Laurel process, and in this sense I am not at all hesitant to proclaim

Mount Laurel a "success.

"2

Neither am I. We have learned from Mount Laurel that the private
housing market can be harnessed, through density bonuses, set-asides,
and other devices, to steer some portion of new housing production, in
good economic times and bad, toward low- and moderate-income housing.
Having acknowledged this important achievement, we must add that
New Jersey's Mount Laurel new housing production has predominantly
served the highest ends of the low- and moderate-income markets and has
made little direct contribution to meeting the housing needs of very lowincome persons. Despite this partial success in meeting its housing production goals, moreover, the Wish-Eisdorfer Report documents Mount
Laurel's apparent failure to achieve any significant progress toward its
two other principal goals: moving city residents to suburban opportunity, and furthering racial integration. Evidence from the Wish-Eisdorfer
Report reveals, in fact, that only 182 households among 2675 cases examined in the Assisted Housing Management Services (AHMS) database
(just over five percent) have moved from cities to suburbs in the past
decade, among them only forty-two black households and three Latino
households (less than two and one percent, respectively).' Even though
these AHMS statistics comprise only one-third of all Mount Laurel units
developed statewide , the totals are truly paltry, measured against the
vast hope, the enormous good faith, and the years of effort that have been
devoted to this campaign.
Some might query whether these negligible "mobility" outcomes
actually represent legislative and administrative failure or instead reveal
unwarranted judicial assumptions built into Mount Laurel's initial approach. Is it not conceivable that New Jersey's urban poor, upon whom
Mount Laurel indulged its judicial solicitude, harbored no desire to aban-

2

Payne, supra note 22, at 674.
& EIsDoRFER, supra note 15, at tbl. 33a.
See id. at 31-32 & tbl. 1.

25 See WISH

'
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don the richness and cultural diversity of city life for the relative sterility
of the white suburbs?'

Was Mount Laurel, in other words, a failure be-

cause it set out to meet a black and Hispanic demand for suburban housing that in fact did not exist?
Regrettably, the AHMS data at the heart of the Wish-Eisdorfer report, rich as they are, were not designed to inform us about the desires
and motivations of New Jersey's Mount Laurel applicants or about the
attitudes of any other participants in the Mount Laurel process. 2 Future

studies should include attitudinal surveys of AHMS applicants, as well as
focus groups drawn from successful applicants, or other scientific studies
designed to gather data on the attitudes, motivations, and housing awareness possessed by Mount Laurel participants as they develop their locational preferences. Such investigations would provide extraordinarily
useful follow-up to this initial study of the behavior of AHMS applicants.
Pending such studies, however, my working hypothesis is that the
outcomes reported by the Wish-Eisdorfer Report do not reflect the preferences of most urban home seekers or renters to remain where they
are.' Perhaps in a state whose principal cities are the centers of its eco27 See generally John 0. Calmore, Spatial Equality and the Kerner Commission Re-

port: A Back-To-The-Future Essay, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1487 (1993) (questioning whether
residential integration of African Americans should be a higher priority than urban enrichment strategies to maintain culturally rich, voluntary black communities); Timothy
Ron Walters, Targeting Resources to Central Cities: A Strategy for Redeveloping the
Black Community, 23 BLACK SCHOLAR 2 (1993) (calling for increased federal investment
to revive central city minority communities).
28 The Wish-Eisdorfer Report and the data developed by the Assisted Housing Management Service (AHMS) demonstrate how very complex it is to differentiate and assess
the needs of various sub-categories of housing seekers: the young with uncertain income
and few assets, the elderly with reduced income but greater assets, families with many
children, the disabled, the female-headed household, and the single-parent family.
Because of this complexity, it is plainly imperative for public agencies such as
COAH to design their information collection and retrieval systems in ways that facilitate
local, regional, and statewide analysis of all significant factors, such as race, gender,
economic status, housing preferences, and attitudinal factors that prompted locations and
housing choices.
29 One reason for my skepticism is the body of social scientific evidence suggesting
that a majority of African Americans would choose racially more integrated residential
communities if not threatened by open violence or more covert hostility after moving to
such communities. See, e.g., Mittie Olion Chandler, Obstacles to Housing Integration
Program Efforts, in THE METrOPOUS IN BLACK & WHITE: PLACE, POWER & POLARIZATION 286, 287 (George C. Galster & Edward W. Hill eds., 1992) (finding that sixtyfive percent of Cleveland blacks would prefer residential neighborhoods in which black
and white families were evenly distributed); Reynolds Farley et al., Continued Racial
Residential Segregation in Detroit: "Chocolate City, Vanilla Suburbs" Revisited, 4 J.
HOUSING REs. 1 (1993) (reporting that, were they able, "almost 90 percent of Detroitarea blacks would move into a neighborhood that had the racial composition [80 percent
white/20 percent black] of the [Detroit] metropolis" as a whole).
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nomic, educational, and social life, such assumptions might be plausible.
But not in New Jersey. The municipalities of Newark, Jersey City, Hoboken, Paterson, Trenton, and Camden simply have not sustained, in the
post-1950 period, the cultural and economic vitality of a Philadelphia,
New York, or Pittsburgh. Indeed, one cannot read the New Jersey Su-

preme Court's remarkable series of school finance decisions from Robinson v. Cahill in 1973' through Abbott v. Burke in 19901 without an
overwhelming conviction that thousands of New Jersey schoolchildren
and their parents would flee New Jersey's central city schools at once if

they were able.

2

Thanks to Marilyn Morheuser's magnificent litigation

in those epic school finance cases, and especially to Chief Justice
Wilentz's searing opinion in Abbott, we understand the harrowing troubles of New Jersey's financially hard-pressed, overburdened school sys-

tems33 and the tax-starved municipalities that cannot adequately fund
them.' It seems unlikely that ninety-five percent of all urban AHMS ap30 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).

31 119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d 359 (1990).
32 Many have already fled New Jersey's larger cities.
Census data from 1930
through 1990 indicate that the populations of Newark, Jersey City, Paterson, Trenton,
Camden, and Elizabeth have all declined dramatically during the past sixty years, especially notable when compared with population increases in the surrounding counties. For
example, Trenton, which was home to 123,356 in 1930, had declined to 88,675 by 1990.
Meanwhile, the population of Mercer County, in which Trenton lies, increased from
187,143 to 325,824. Similarly, the population of Newark decreased from 442,337 in
1930 to 275,221 in 1990, while Camden's population decreased from 118,700 to 87,492.
While the overall populations of each city have declined, the minority populations have
increased. For example, from 1980 to 1990, the white population of Trenton declined by
7,695 while the African American population rose by 1,829 and the Hispanic population
rose by 5,170. In Newark, both the white and African American populations declined
during that decade, while Hispanic population increased by 10,507. See New Jersey
State Data Center, New Jersey Municipalities with 35,000 Persons or More (visited Dec.
18, 1996) <http://www.mnjpin.state.nj.us/OneStopCareerCenter/LaborMarketlnforma
tion/lmiOl/mtpop8O90.htm >.
33 The Abbott court stated:
[The] disadvantage in expenditures per pupil is clearly related to all of the
other aspects of poverty that define poorer urban districts and their
youth.... [W]e conclude that... the poorer the district... the less the
per pupil expenditure; the poorer and more urban the district, the greater
the school tax burden; whatever the measure of disadvantage, need, and
poverty--the greater it is, the less there is to spend.
Abbott, 119 N.J. at 335, 575 A.2d at 383.
34 The Abbott court explained:
The poorer urban school districts, sharing the same tax base with the municipality, suffer from severe municipal overburden; they are extremely
reluctant to increase taxes for school purposes. Not only is their local tax
levy well above average, so is their school tax rate. The oppressiveness of
the tax burden on their citizens by itself would be sufficient to give them
pause before raising taxes. Additionally, the rates in some cases are so
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plicants, fully apprised of their options, would freely have chosen to remain in areas so starved for fiscal resources and so bereft of public services. Nor has my review of the 1990 Census figures on Newark, Elizabeth, Paterson, Trenton, and Camden persuaded me that low crime rates
or rosy employment prospects have prompted most urban residents to
remain.3 5
Instead, I surmise, the AHMS applicants have not been provided the
useful housing counseling work, pioneered by Alexander Polikoff and
others in Chicago's ongoing Gautreaux litigation and so usefully documented by James Rosenbaum and his colleagues at Northwestern,' that
might well have led to different outcomes.
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE CHOICES THAT HAVE UNDERCUT MOUNTLAUREL
If we assume many Mount Laurel applicants would have preferred to
move to suburban communities, why didn't they do so? The principal
factors that may have frustrated those inter-city moves are no mystery.
First, there have been very few Mount Laurel units waiting in most New
Jersey communities. The legislature chose not to make the Mount Laurel
process mandatory, 3 7 and most New Jersey municipalities have simply
decided to ignore the "fair share" obligations that the New Jersey Supreme Court and the 1985 legislation imposed upon them in principle.
Again, indebted to Professor Payne, let me note that only 158 among
New Jersey's 567 municipalities have come forward to seek COAH certihigh that further taxation may actually decrease tax revenues by diminishing total property values, either directly because of the tax-value relationship, or indirectly by causing business and industry to relocate to another
municipality... The social and economic pressures on municipalities,
school districts, public officials, and citizens of these disaster areas-many
poorer urban districts-are so severe that tax increases in any substantial
amount are almost unthinkable.
Abbott, 119 N.J. at 355-57, 575 A.2d at 393-94.
35 The unemployment rates in these cities during the 1990s have remained significantly above those for the State of New Jersey and for the nation as a whole. For example, between 1990 and 1995, Newark's adult unemployment rate ranged from 10.7% to
16.1%, while Camden suffered unemployment rates during the same period from 16.4 to
24.2%. See New Jersey Dep't. of Labor, Annual Average Labor Force Estimates By
Municipality (visited Dec. 18, 1996) <http://www.mnjpin.state.nj.us/ OneStopCareerCenter/LaborMarketInformation/Imill 1/lfmun92.htm >.
3
See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). See generally JAMES E. ROSENBAUM
& SUSAN J. POPKIN, THE GAUTREAUX

PROGRAM: AN EXPERIMENT IN RACIAL AND

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1990); James E. Rosenbaum, Changing the Geography of Opportunity by Expanding Residential Choice: Lessons from the Gautreaux Program, 6
HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 231 (1995).
37 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-300(a) and (b) (West 1995) (stating that "each municipality which so elects shall ... notify the council of its intent to submit to the council
its fair share housing plan") (emphasis added).
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fication of Mount Laurel plans, and of those 158, fewer than half shouldered COAH-determined municipal obligations in excess of fifty residen-

tial units.' Professor Payne's explanation for the low participation rate is
surely correct. The legislature chose to prompt municipal compliance
solely by recognizing a "builder's remedy" that allows a housing devel-

oper to override local zoning provisions and build inclusionary developments if a municipality has no approved "fair share" plan.

proach provides, at best, a partial remedy.

9

This ap-

The statute offers neither

financial incentives nor legislative support to public advocates or private

attorneys who otherwise might well be willing to mount legal challenges.
Because the number of municipalities that face actual threat from builders
or public interest lawyers is very small, so is the degree of municipal
compliance.
Second, the 1985 statute and COAH regulations have omitted any
express racial and/or ethnic goals for "fair share" communities. Indeed,
there is not even a provision for basic monitoring, either by COAH or by

participating municipalities, to ensure racial diversity.'

Hence, suburban

jurisdictions can make housing decisions, ostensibly in compliance with
Mount Laurel directives, subject only to the weak anti-discrimination
provisions of federal and state fair housing laws.4" The undeniable result

of these omissions is clear from the Wish-Eisdorfer Report: virtually no
racially integrative moves have occurred. African Americans and Latinos

have remained almost exclusively in New Jersey's cities.
Third, the 1985 statute does not require New Jersey municipalities

affirmatively to market their new Mount Laurel units to low- and moderate-income residents in urban areas. Though the COAH regulations have

included some extremely minimal affirmative marketing requirements,42
38 See Payne, supra note 22, at 676-77.
3 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-313 to 52:27D-317 (West 1995).
4o The substantive rules developed by COAH formally prescribed municipal goals

solely in income terms, without regard either to racial characteristics or urban location:
"[A] municipality's housing element shall be designed to achieve the goal of providing
affordable housing to meet present and prospective housing needs, with particular attention to low and moderate income housing." N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 93-5.1(b) (1995).
Moreover, COAH's specification of required demographic criteria plainly omitted any
racial or ethnic requirements: "The housing element... shall contain the following: .... An analysis of the municipality's demographic characteristics, including, but
not limited to, household size, income level and age." Id. § 93-5.1(b)(3).
41 See John Charles Boger, Toward Ending Residential Segregation: A Fair Share
Proposal for the Next Reconstruction, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1573, 1581-85 & nn. 36-42
(analyzing why the Fair Housing Act has failed to curb residential discrimination).
42 The COAH regulations included a subchapter devoted to "Affirmative Marketing,"
see N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 93-11 (1995), but apart from the general requirement that
each complying municipality develop an affirmative marketing plan and report its details
to COAH, the only specified marketing requirement was that "there shall be at least one
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and though AHMS apparently has been helpful, upon request, to those
jurisdictions that affirmatively sought lists of prospective urban buyers or
renters, neither the statute nor COAH has required suburban communities
to notify all urban residents when new housing opportunities become
available. Not surprisingly, this system (or rather, this lack of a system)
has substantially favored low-income persons who already reside in
communities that are developing Mount Laurel units, because local residents are far more likely to receive informal notice from local newspaper

articles, from city officials, or from their own observations of construction activity of new housing opportunities.'

This built-in preference for local residents would not have defeated
urban relocation if COAH had calculated each municipality's fair share to

include both its indigenous housing need as well as its full proportionate
share of the regional need. That appears not to have occurred. The
fourth principal flaw, in other words, is that COAH set its overall calculation of low- and moderate-income housing needs far too low, so that
many communities can readily fill their fair share of obligations by offering Mount Laurel units locally to doubled-up residents, young families
in early-career status, elderly persons, and others already within community borders.
A fifth flaw in New Jersey's legislative approach has been the reliance upon new housing as the all-but-exclusive source of Mount Laurel
units, while placing minimal demands on older municipalities without
undeveloped land." In New Jersey, such fully-developed communities
comprise the inner-ring of suburbs surrounding major cities; they tend to
paid advertisement in a newspaper of general circulation within the housing region during
the first week of the marketing program," listing the location of the units, the sizes,
prices, and income eligibility standard, see N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 93-11.3(c) (1995),
and that applications for units be available "in several convenient locations," including
"the municipal administrative building(s), the municipal library and.., the developer's
sales office." Id. § 93-11.3(d).
4
See generally Martha Lamar, Mount Laurel at Work.- Affordable Housing in New
Jersey, 1983-1988, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 1197, 1222-23 (1989) (noting that among ten
COAH-approved suburban municipalities, most had adopted criteria that favored local
applicants over outsiders); see also Herbert Franklin et al., Inclusionary Programs and
the Larger Public Interest, in AFrER MOUNT LAUREL: THE NEw SUBURBAN ZONING 299,
301 (Jerome G. Rose & Robert E. Rothman eds., 1977) (warning that without statutory
constraints, Mount Laurel units would likely become occupied by local residents rather
than inter-city migrants).
44 The 1985 Fair Housing Act authorized municipalities to meet their "fair share"
obligations through many alternative means. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-311.a.(1)(8) (West 1995) (providing alternatives including density bonuses, infrastructure expansion and rehabilitation, tax abatements, utilization of state or federal funds, and donation
or use of municipal land). The drafters expressly provided, however, that "[n]othing is
this act shall require a municipality to raise or expend municipal revenues in order to
provide low and moderate income housing." Id. § 52:27D-3 11(d).
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be the most desirable sites for out-migration from the cities, because their
more ready public transportation access allows easier commutation to city
jobs and other city services. Employed low- or moderate-income residents of Newark, for example, are unlikely to seek housing thirty or
forty miles from the city, in suburban Morristown or Wayne; moves to
the near-in suburbs of Bloomfield, Glen Ridge, Montclair, or Caldwell
are doubtless far more attractive. Yet far away Morristown and Wayne
were assigned "fair share" obligations of 225 and 231 units respectively,
while nearby Bloomfield was assigned zero, Glen Ridge seventeen,
Montclair two, and Caldwell nineteen.'
A sixth flaw, has been the decision to rely almost exclusively on the
private housing market as a solution to the Mount Laurel problem. Private developers are understandably concerned primarily with maximizing
their own profits, and although the density bonuses and set-asides have
drawn many developers into Mount Laurel building activity, their design
choices inevitably tend toward new construction over rehabilitation, toward the highest-end units, and toward units for smaller families or the
elderly, over those designed for larger and poorer families.
In short, the statute has effectively allowed municipalities to meet
their fair share obligations by passing the obligation along to developers
who, in turn, have tended to serve only the better off among low- and
moderate-income households. Because New Jersey has a relatively high
median income level ($38,000 in 1990), and because eligibility for
"moderate income" units was pegged at eighty percent of New Jersey's
median income (and for "low income" was set at fifty percent of median),' Mount Laurel units can legally be targeted at applicants with incomes of $19,000 to $30,000 per year. Such households admittedly experience real housing need in many New Jersey housing markets, but
their incomes place them far above the beneficiaries originally contemplated in Mount Laurel.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO IMPLEMENT MOUNTLAUREL
During the Civil Rights era, as I have noted in an earlier article,47
parties seeking racial integration learned through bitter experience that

4s See the New Jersey Council on Affordable Housing, Substantive Rules for the period beginning June 6, 1994 as amended through September 5, 1995.
4
COAH defined "low-income housing" and "moderate-income housing" based
upon gross household income as compared to the "median gross income of households of
the same size within the same housing region," N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 93-1.3
(1995), and set low and moderate income ceilings at fifty percent and eighty percent of
this median respectively. See id. § 93-7.4(g).
47 See Boger, supra note 41, at 1585-90.
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neither moral exhortation nor punishment of individual acts of wrongdoing provide sufficient incentives to change public and private conduct as
deeply ingrained as America's centuries-old pattern of racial segregation.
Instead, well-meaning civil rights legislation to curb discrimination in
public education, private employment, and voting perennially floundered
until Congress summoned the will to insist upon objective, measurable
outcomes to be achieved under clear timetables, backed by the threat of
significant financial loss."
New Jersey's Mount Laurel approach adopted the first of these three
intertwined strategies by quantifying "fair share" obligations for each
community. The New Jersey Legislature set no meaningful timetables,
however, and enforcement of "fair share" obligations has lagged severely. I have previously suggested one device to address the problem of
continuing residential segregation that has proven especially resistant to
change because of the interplay of public and market forces. My proposal involved the adoption of a national version of the "fair share" approach initiated by Mount Laurel, the 1985 Fair Housing Act, and
COAH, which I continue to believe is the most promising paradigm for
national action in this area, despite its legislative flaws. 9 My earlier
proposal included, as its principal enforcement device, the gradual reduction of the benefits of federal property tax and mortgage interest deductions for all taxpayers who choose to remain in municipalities that decline to fulfill their fair share obligations.'
Such tax deductions
presently represent indirect federal housing subsidies, or "tax expenditures," for the benefit of homeowners," and in municipalities where noncompliance with fair share housing policies remain the norm, such subsidies are unjustified.
Under my proposed plan, penalties would be imposed incrementally,
perhaps a loss of ten percent of the value of the tax deduction each year,
with the expectation that concerned taxpayers would quickly press their
local representatives to bring any non-compliant municipality into line
with national housing objectives. As a consequence, no penalty would
likely be imposed in most jurisdictions. Transposing such an incentive
system from the federal context, where I initially proposed it, to the state
context, where property tax exemptions are less significant, might require
modification, perhaps an incremental, state-imposed surcharge on a citizen's property tax itself. In New Jersey, however, the enactment of the

4 See id.
4
See id. at 1590-601.
50 See id. at 1601-11.
51 See generally STANLEY SURREY & PATRICK McDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985).
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Property Tax Deduction Act of 199652 provides a ready vehicle for imposing this incentive. Under that statute, New Jersey taxpayers may deduct up to $2500 from their 1996 income taxes, up to $5625 in 1997, and

up to $10,000 in
taxes.' If New
deduction would
to comply with

1998, based upon the amount they have paid in property
Jersey declared that some graduated percentage of that
be withdrawn from taxpayers in municipalities that fail
their "fair share" obligations, strong citizen support

would quickly build for municipal compliance with Mount Laurel policies.

The general reception to my tax penalty proposal has ranged from
amusement to impatient dismissal as politically unrealistic. Critics offer

two objections.

The first objection incorporates a general critique of

"tax penalties" as instruments of social policy. In a carefully reasoned
article,' Professor Eric Zolt has faulted most tax penalties as
"remarkably crude policy instruments" that "fail to increase the cost [of
the penalized conduct] in a manner sufficiently related to the harm caused
by the activity," and that are, consequently, both economically inefficient
and potentially inequitable. 5
The tax penalty I have proposed, however, should survive the rigorous scrutiny of Professor Zolt. To be sure, my proposal lacks what Zolt
calls "vertical equity,"' because its phased withdrawal scheme tends to
penalize taxpayers with large mortgage interest and property tax deductions more, in absolute dollar terms, than less affluent property holders in
the same communities.57 Yet that apparent inequity mirrors precisely the
relative advantage that wealthier property owners currently enjoy from

the current structure of federal and state tax expenditures on residential
property. If the value of their properties reflects, in part, the perceived
2 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54A:3A-15 to 3A-22.
53 See id. See generally Amy Zurzola, Property Tax Break Launched at Beach;
Whitman Makes It N.J. 's Holiday Gift, ASBURY PARK PRESs, July 5, 1996, at Al.
5 See Eric M. Zolt, Deterrence Via Taxation: A Critical Analysis of Tax Penalty
Provisions, 37 UCLA L. REV. 343 (1989). Professor Zolt observes that Congress has
markedly increased its reliance on tax penalties to deter a variety of non-tax-related conduct, including illegal activity such as the payment of bribes and kickbacks, see I.R.C. §
162(f) & (c) (1982), as well conduct that is not illegal, but which Congress nonetheless
wishes to discourage, such as providing lucrative one-time payments, called "golden
parachutes," to highly placed corporate executives upon a change of corporate control,
see I.R.C. § 280G (Supp. IV 1986); id. § 4999 (1984), or doing business with South Africa prior to the end of apartheid. See I.R.C. § 901(j) (Supp. V 1987).
s See Zolt, supra note 54, at 344.
s See id. at 358.
57 For example, a property holder with a $200,000 mortgage might have a $16,000
mortgage interest deduction available yearly, while the holder of a $100,000 mortgage at
the same interest rate would have only an $8000 deduction. Hence, a 10% withdrawal of
that deduction would take $1600 from the first taxpayer and only $800 from the second.
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value of the racial and economic exclusivity of the communities in which
they live (on the assumption that communities comprised of all-white and
all-middle or upper-class neighbors are more desirable in a region's
housing market), then their communities' collective refusal to assume fair
share obligations ought, in fairness, to adversely affect most severely
those who have benefited most from their tax-subsidized exclusivity.
Professor Zolt also questions whether tax penalties conform to any
economically rational theory. One such theory, Zolt has suggested,
would be founded in deterrence; if Congress were careful to "mak[e] the
expected cost of punishment exceed the expected gain of the offense, the
government [would] at least deter[ ] rational offenders from engaging in
the harmful activity."' 8 An alternative theory, Zolt suggests, would look
beyond the taxpayer's private calculus of gain or loss in order to
"consider [both public and private] costs of both crimes and punishments, and seek[ ] to minimize the total cost to society of the undesirable
activity." While Professor Zolt argues that very few tax penalties meet
either objective, my proposal is designed to meet both. Not only would
its tax disincentives work most strongly in communities that are presently
the most segregated and economically stratified; a secondary economic
effect is that the proposal would automatically bring market forces to
bear on municipalities that proved especially stubborn. Because tax deductions are rightly considered a major benefit of home ownership, property holders in communities that do not comply would see the value of
their property decline in comparison to similar properties in complying
cities and towns. This would provide an economic consideration to
counterbalance the widespread perception that low-income and minority
renters or homeowners adversely affect a community's property values.
In effect, such perceptions would be transformed. Property values would
begin to decline only in those communities that did not include some
"fair share" of low-income residents, and would decline most in those
communities that persisted in their refusal until all tax subsidies were
lost.'

M

See Zolt, supra note 54, at 361.

59 See id.

60 See Boger, supra note 41, at 1606-11. Another consideration that looms large in
Professor Zolt's analysis is the governmental difficulty in detecting non-compliance with
private conduct sought to be deterred by tax penalties, with the result that the deterrent
effect of a tax penalty will depend, in some perhaps unknowable part, on taxpayer calculations about the likelihood of detection. See Zolt, supra note 54, at 367-68. Because my
proposal would involve publicly announced, easily verifiable housing goals for each
community, taxpayers would have full notice of compliance standards, and the government would know precisely when the penalties should be applied, and against whom.
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The second major objection to my proposal is political. No sane
Congress or self-interested state legislature would ever adopt it, some insist, because it defies the current beliefs and values of local constituents.
Regrettably, in the present political climate, that assessment is surely correct. Many voters seem suspicious of all centrally imposed governmental
initiatives, adamantly opposed to heavier tax burdens for any purpose,
and indifferent or actively hostile to the needs of racial minorities and the
poor. Yet my proposal, as we have seen, is not designed to raise any additional tax revenues, and its central insight, derived directly from Mount
Laurel itself, is that if each community will assume its "fair share" of a
region's lower-income residents, their collective agreement will provide
an effective long-term social response to the poverty and racial isolation
so resistant to other contemporary approaches.
Moreover, mounting evidence of the disastrous social injury of racial and economic isolation suggests that to pursue the present course
trades short-term political gain for disastrous long-term loss. Professor
Michael Schill has reported that the concentration of extreme inner-city
poverty in the United States doubled from 1970-1990. The population
living in urban neighborhoods where over forty percent of residents are
poor grew from 2.69 million to 5.50 million in that twenty-year period.61
Schill reflects a growing consensus among social scientists that
"[c]oncentrated inner-city poverty generates problems that are different
both in kind and in magnitude from those experienced by poor people in
other geographic settings."'
Specifically, children in neighborhoods
with few adults who are themselves gainfully employed tend to "develop
weak attachment to the labor force . .. frequently engage in deviant or
illegal activities further distancing themselves from middle class
norms."' Philip Tegeler has added that "[tihis physical separation and
isolation of poor minority families deprives children of access to economic opportunity and perpetuates disadvantage across generations. " '
Professor John Powell has summarized these effects as follows:
61 Michael H. Schill & Susan M Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law

and Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 143 U.PA. L. REv. 1285, 1287,
tbl. 1 (1995) (examining data on the nation's 100 largest cities).
6 Id. at 1289. See generally MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 16, at 167-76; GARY
ORFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION:

THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V.

BOARD OF EDUCATION (1996); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED:
THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 56-588 (1987); WIujAM Juuus
WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996); Scott

A. Boleus, Concentrated Poverty and Metropolitan Equity Strategies, 8 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 11 (1997).
3 Schill & Wachter, supra note 61, at 1289.
64 Philip D. Tegeler, Housing Segregationand Local Discretion, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 209,
209 (1994).
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The spatial divisions of metropolitan America, and the exclusion and
deprivation that accompany them, have ...

created dual realities for

the white majority and the racial Other. Concentrating minorities in
the inner city and excluding them from resources, power, and the potential for advancement has led to the concentration of poverty, crime,
poor education, and other severe antisocial phenomena. Conversely,
white suburbanites have been largely shielded from the effects of this
deprivation and the public cost of confronting them. In essence, the
racialization of space has subsidized white suburban America at the
severe expense of minorities.65
These are not trivial consequences. New Jersey's "fair share" approach, coupled with a tax disincentive plan with a realistic prospect of
reducing New Jersey's (and the nation's) widening racial and economic
chasm, would go far to avoid their most injurious effects.
VI.

REFLECTIONS ON MouNTLAUREL AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE

My analysis has looked at the successes and the failures of Mount
Laurel. Success has been measured in the tens of thousands of Mount
Laurel housing units now scattered throughout New Jersey. The failure
is reflected in the dismaying data on continued racial isolation and immobility that emerge from the Wish-Eisdorfer Report. It is crucial, however, to draw the right lesson from that evidence. Mount Laurel has not
been a failure of judicial insight and authority but of legislative will.

New Jersey's lawmakers could have designed statutes and regulations, as
my own tax proposal suggests, that would have met all three principal
goals of Mount Laurel. They chose, perhaps consciously, to do otherwise. We know that strong political forces have battled from the beginning against full implementation of Mt. Laurel's original design. The
legislative provision for Regional Contribution Agreements'

is perhaps

65 John A. Powell, Tax Policy and Racial Segregation in Housing, Address Before the
ABA Tax Section, Tax and Social Policy Forum, (Aug. 2, 1996) (forthcoming as How

Government Tax and Racial Policy Have Racially Segregated America, in TAXING
AMERICA (Mary Louise Fellows & Karen B. Brown eds., 1997).
6 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-312 (West 1995). This provision of the 1985 Fair
Housing Act allows a municipality to
propose the transfer of up to 50% of its fair share to another municipality
within its housing region by means of a contractual agreement into which
two municipalities voluntarily enter.... The regional contribution agreement entered into shall specify how the housing shall be provided by the

second municipality, hereinafter the receiving municipality, and the amount
of contributions to be made by the first municipality, hereinafter the sending municipality.
Id. § 52:27D-312(a). This feature has rightly, in my judgment, drawn criticism for its
deliberate design to avoid potentially inter-city and racially integrative residential moves
by allowing suburban communities (acting as sending municipalities) to send up to half of
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the best evidence of how vigorously and successfully suburban jurisdictions fought in the New Jersey legislature to sabotage the most threatening features of the original judicial goal-the actual movement of lowincome minority citizens to their communities-and how much they are
willing to pay to exempt themselves from these unwanted newcomers.
In his important work, THE HOLLOW HOPE, Professor Rosenberg
contrasted two models of judicial action. The first, which he calls the
"Dynamic Court" model, views courts as "powerful, vigorous, and potent proponents of change," able to "produce significant social reform
even when the other branches of government are inactive or opposed." 7
He contrasts this with the "Constrained Court," an alternative model
that perceives "courts as weak, ineffective, and powerless." Proponents
of this latter perspective, from Alexander Hamilton to Alexander Bickel,
have insisted that "the 'least dangerous' branch can do little more than
point out how actions have fallen short of constitutional or legislative requirements and hope that appropriate action is taken." "
Professor Rosenberg sets out to assess empirically these alternative
models by measuring judicial capacity to achieve what he calls
"significant social change:"

Mhe most interesting and relevant cases, such as Brown and Roe [v.
Wade], occur when activist courts overrule and invalidate the actions
of elected officials, or order actions beyond what elected officials are
willing to do. What happens then? Are courts effective producers of
change, as the Dynamic Court view suggests, or do their decisions do
little more than point the way to a brighter, but perhaps unobtainable
future? Once again, the conflict between two deeply held views about
the role of the courts in the American political system has an obvious
normative dimension that is worth debating. But this book has a different aim. Relying heavily on empirical data, I ask under what conditions can courts produce political and social change? When does it
make sense for individuals and groups pressing for such change to
litigate? What do the answers mean about the nature of the American
regime?6

their Mount Laurel units to New Jersey's housing-needy central cities (acting as receiving
municipalities). As Professor Harold McDougall has observed, the weak financial position of New Jersey's major cities has made such deals all but impossible for them to decline, even though they contribute to the maintenance of economic and racial isolation in
New Jersey as a whole. See Harold A. McDougall, Regional Contribution Agreements:
Compenation for Exclusionary Zoning, 60 TEMPLE L.Q. 665, 681-95 (1987).
67 ROSENBERG, supra note 13, at 2.
' Id. at3.
Id.at 4.
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Professor Rosenberg's empirical investigation of civil rights activity
in the decades following the Brown decision has led him to defy conventional wisdom by doubting the practical impact of Brown:
In sum, the Dynamic Court view's claim that a major contribution of
courts in civil rights was to give the issue salience, press political
elites to act, prick the consciences of whites, legitimate the grievances
of blacks, and fire blacks up to act is not substantiated. In all the
places examined, wherever evidence supportive of the claim should
exist, it does not.... The evidence suggests that Brown's major
positive impact was limited to reinforcing the belief in a legal strategy
for change of those already committed to it. The burden of showing
that Brown accomplished more now rests squarely on those who for
years have written and spoken of its immeasurable importance. 70
Although some critics have questioned his methods and measurement tools, 71 Professor Rosenberg's most telling examination is quite persuasive on its own terms. He explores the well-known 15-year delay that
occurred between the Court's 1954 decision in Brown and the effective
desegregation of most Southern schools, which did not begin until the
late 1960s. Professor Rosenberg's tables and graphs effectively demonstrate that, until Congress was moved to enact the Civil Rights Act of
1964' and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965,'
thereby giving the Department of Health, Education and Welfare both financial carrots and administrative sticks to wield against recalcitrant
Southern school districts, forward progress against public school segregation was brought to a virtual standstill by open defiance from many
Southern governors and legislators and by the more genteel defiance reflected in endless rear-guard actions waged by Southern school boards in
federal courts.'
Concluding from this evidence that Brown had no direct effects,
Professor Rosenberg charitably searched for evidence that Brown exercised substantial indirect influence by forcing civil rights issues into national prominence, by prompting political elites to embrace a broader vision of civil rights, by inspiring African Americans to pursue mass
'o
71

Id. at 156.
See, e.g., Samuel Krislov, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social

Change? 9 CONST. CoMM. 367, 368-70 (1992) (observing that Rosenberg's measures of
Brown's effectiveness were too limited, that he failed to credit Brown for any partial successes, and that his framing of the question prevented him from reaching more histori-

cally sensitive, nuanced conclusions).
72 See Pub. L. No. 88-352 §§ 401, 601-02, 78 Stat. 246, 252-53 (1964) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000c & 2000d-1 (1988)).
73 See Pub. L. No. 89-10, 70 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-246

(1988)).
74

See ROSENBERG, supra note 13, at 46-54.
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political action, or by changing the hearts of America's white majority.
His examination of contemporary national opinion polls, news coverage,
biographies of black and white leaders of the Civil Rights era, and other
plausible sources, however, failed to uncover evidence that Brown itself
had been deeply influential in any of these areas.75 Rosenberg ultimately
identified other, non-judicial forces that could, in his view, sufficiently
account for the desegregation that eventually did occur in public life.76
In my judgment, Professor Rosenberg's harsh deductions from his
evidence are not fully warranted. The handiwork of Brown was not the
immediate transformation of the racial composition of Southern schoolrooms. Nor did its lawyerly reasoning become the bed-time reading of
community organizers or black Baptist preachers. Yet the Supreme
Court's decision in Brown served as more than an aspirational statement,
more even than has been claimed for it by Rosenberg's critics who argue
that "courts can facilitate ... significant social change" merely by "the
placement of issues on the public agenda."' So long as Brown remained
"the law" on desegregation, civil rights activists and their allies could
press the battle against their well-entrenched opponents, hopeful that if
and when their legal contests reached the final judicial arbiter, the activists would prevail. The Court unmistakably signaled its determination to
stand by black school children in a rare opinion signed by all nine Justices in the Little Rock school desegregation case.' Though full affirmative relief eluded school desegregation advocates for nearly a decade
thereafter, this federal judicial commitment, set forth so unconditionally
in those early cases, created the legal context for, and legitimated in constitutional terms, the very rights that community advocates, street demonstrators, and courageous legislators struggled to redeem thereafter.
However little civil rights advocates may have known about the specific
details of these cases, the Supreme Court's steadfast opinions provided
the overarching sanction for their actions, the ultimate assurance that
their cause was just, despite fierce legal challenge.
Doubtless, had Congress ultimately repudiated the Court's teachings
and abandoned its own commitment to judicial authority and federal supremacy, the Brown decision would have become a dead letter, as did the
Equal Protection Clause during the closing decades of the nineteenth
century. Courts cannot ultimately triumph over the democratic branches

7 See id at 111-55.

76 See id. at 157-69.

77 Malcolm M. Feeley, Hollow Hopes, Flypaper, and Metaphors, 1993 L. & Soc.
INQUIRY 745, 752 (1993) (restating the argument of Professor Stuart Scheingold in THE
POLITICS OF RIGHTS (1974)).

78 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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without eventually winning their acquiescence. Yet the Court's countermajoritarian power "to say what the law is," as Chief Justice Marshall
proclaimed in Marbury v. Madison,' has an extraordinary legitimating
force, which can empower a minority to come forward and claim the
protection of those rights the courts have identified and reserved for
them. That legitimating force was the heart of Brown; it was also the
deepest gift of Mt. Laurel.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The principal question provoked by the Wish-Eisdorfer Report is
whether New Jersey legislators and citizens have even begun to appropriate Mount Laurel's principal lessons. The Court's deepest teachings
were not about zoning laws or the intricacies of the New Jersey constitution, but about the long-term, societal foolhardiness of ignoring the social
and economic injury that accompanies concentrated urban poverty and
racial isolation. Professor Rosenberg correctly observes that the judicial
branch cannot, alone, translate such insights into effective political and
administrative change. If courts face relentless political resistance, even
their wisest judicial guidance will be distorted or ignored, domesticated
or trivialized. Yet when it acts with intelligence and moral courage, as
the New Jersey Supreme Court did repeatedly in the Mount Laurel cases,
the judiciary serves an indispensable role as the great countermajoritarian teacher in a democratic society, bringing hard truths to a
public that would prefer to ignore them. That role is one that courts
should not and cannot abandon if the nation is to make meaningful progress toward its most deeply professed national goals. To suggest that the
judicial task is fruitless, simply because courts alone cannot assure significant social change, is to draw the wrong conclusion from the evidence.
Our Symposium title, "Mount Laurel: What Lessons Have We
Learned?", can thus be recognized as posing two questions, not one.
The first seeks to know the substantive teachings of Mount Laurel, and
thereby to gauge its intellectual achievements. The second asks whether
we have fully embraced those lessons; it measures our national character.
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5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

